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INTRODUCTION
China’s phenomenal growth over the last three decades has come at
a well-documented price. High profile environmental disasters and the
nation’s pollution problems leading up to the Beijing Olympics have
exposed the world to the problems China faces internally. With so much
attention being paid to these domestic issues, it is easy to overlook the
other side of China’s environmental footprint: the country’s rapid growth
has required unprecedented levels of resource consumption, and China is
now reaching into the farthest corners of the globe in its search for raw
materials. The finished products available on store shelves around the
world may be labeled “Made in China,” but they began as copper from
mines in Zambia, timber from dwindling swathes of rainforest in Gabon
and Guinea, and iron from the Congolese jungle—all shipped to China
and forged into products using oil from Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria.
This article focuses on this aspect of the supply chain. During the
last decade, China has forged close trade relationships with the many
developing African nations that are eager to capitalize on their natural
resources. This eagerness for foreign investment, however, can have
disastrous effects on the local environment. As Sino-African trade
relations continue to expand, China, African nations, and the
international community must develop a more effective environmental
regulatory system in order to protect local environments from
irresponsible corporate development.
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This article identifies the array of environmental problems
surrounding Chinese resource extraction in these developing nations and
recommends reasonable and potentially effective legal solutions. Part I
provides background on China’s consumption of African resources and
the negative effects the trade relationship has on the environment in
Africa. Part II explains why traditional legal regimes are often
inadequate to address the issues that arise in international resource
extraction projects. Part III examines the roles of each of the Chinese
bureaus and agencies that influence or regulate foreign investments. Part
IV explains the common goals that might be achieved if these
departments emphasized responsible corporate conduct abroad. Part V
considers several approaches that might help reduce the negative
environmental impacts associated with the growing trade relationship
between China and African nations. We hope that this analysis can
provide policymakers with some new ideas and approaches, so we have
focused our efforts on developing suggestions that are realistic and take
into account the unique circumstances of both Chinese and African
governance.1
It is important to stress at the outset that China is by no means the
only nation whose corporations have caused environmental destruction
in developing nations. American and European explorers and
corporations have exploited developing nations for centuries, and there is
plenty of literature available detailing these investments and activities.
However, China’s shifting role in the global economy—from capitalrecipient to capital-exporter—is just beginning and is therefore ripe for
both discussion and early policy implementation that might help all
parties achieve short and long term goals.
I. SINO-AFRICAN TRADE
A. China’s Expansion into Africa
Trade between China and Africa has flourished primarily as a result
of China’s expanding need for raw materials and African nations’ hunger
1. Additionally, we have constrained our analysis to legal and governmental issues, thereby
excluding several topics that are closely linked to the problems we will identify. Most noticeably, we
have refrained from delving too deeply into international law regimes and the voluntary measures
that corporations use to hold themselves to a higher standard of conduct than is legally required.
Many Chinese corporations have signed onto the U.N. Global Compact, for example, and adopted
internal systems to minimize their impacts overseas. While these kinds of initiatives and partnerships will be an important part of China’s global corporate citizenship going forward, our goal has
been to focus on legal and governmental actions rather than to analyze every possible method that
could help address this daunting problem. This narrow focus will allow us to provide more concrete
analysis and recommendations for policy planners and regulators both in China and abroad.
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for capital investment.2 China is currently the top consumer worldwide
of aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin, zinc, iron ore, coal, wheat, rice,
palm oil, cotton, and rubber.3 It has been the world’s leading consumer
and producer of steel for over a decade, producing approximately onethird of the world’s total output, three times the amount of the United
States or Japan.4 All of this production and growth have also vaulted
China into the upper echelon of energy and oil consumers, second only
to the United States.5 Clearly, all of this consumption is a result of the
increased production of finished goods, stainless steel, electrical wiring,
cable and infrastructure that have occurred in China throughout the last
few decades. With GDP and per capita income still on the rise, demand
will only increase in the foreseeable future.
The dichotomy is clear: Chinese corporations are flush with cash
from years of unprecedented growth and eager to secure long-term
access to the minerals and fuel that will be the lifeblood of its production
economy for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the African
continent holds some of the richest resource reserves on Earth, but many
of its nations remain among the world’s poorest.6 The result is a
marriage of opportunity between some of the most notoriously unstable
and corrupt governments in the world and Chinese companies seeking
access to the resources those governments control.
Thus, China—a relatively new player in the game of international
resource acquisition—has worked hard to cultivate its relationships with
the African nations that are capable of providing the resources it needs.
Because outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) emanating from
China was limited to a few government run companies until the mid1980s, the Chinese business behemoth was not turned loose on the global
acquisitions market until just two decades ago. As a result, the vast
majority of accessible resource reserves were already in the hands of
major multinationals—many of them based in Europe or the United
States—by the time Chinese companies began searching for foreign
supplies of oil and minerals. Many of the available reserves that were not
already depleted were (and still are) located in less developed or volatile
2. TAMARA TRINH ET AL., CHINA’S COMMODITY HUNGER, IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA AND
LATIN AMERICA 2 (Maria L.Lanzeni ed., Deutsch Bank Research 2006).
3. Daniel Griswold, Director, Ctr. for Trade Policy Studies, Cato Inst., Address to the Annual
Meeting of TEGMA/CMC, The Competition for World Resources: China's Demand for Commodities (Feb. 8, 2007), available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10906.
4. Id.
5. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: CHINA (May 2011), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Full.html.
6. Econ. & Soc. Council of the United Nations, Least Developed Countries, NATIONS ONLINE
PROJECT, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/least_developed_countries.htm (last visited Feb.
29, 2012).
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nations in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Chinese firms took
advantage of these openings by making overtures to nations that many
Western companies had ignored or avoided because of concerns over the
safety of their investments or the perceived problems of doing business
with unstable or undemocratic governments.7
The Chinese government itself paved the way for many of these
arrangements, both by offering incentives for Chinese firms to “go
global”8 in their hunt for resources, and by cultivating relationships with
the governments of African nations like Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria, all
of which are now major oil suppliers to China.9 China holds a great deal
of African debt as well, which the State Council regularly refinances or
forgives outright when it seeks to gain good will or needs a bargaining
chip with a debtor nation.10 Finally, Chinese government officials have
signed off on dozens of commodities agreements that guarantee access or
fixed prices to Chinese firms in exchange for Chinese-financed or
constructed infrastructure projects. Widely known as “oil-forinfrastructure,” these arrangements are seen by both sides as the most
efficient way to provide what each nation needs most. They have become
routine in almost every African nation with which China enjoys
significant financial ties.
These financial ties are indeed profound. “More than 800 Chinese
State-owned companies are managing about 900 projects in Africa, many
of them in the oil industry. Last year Sino-African trade was $106.8
billion U.S., ten times the level of 2000 and more than double the value
of bilateral trade in 2006.”11 The benefits flow both ways, however.
While China enjoys increased access to much needed resources, African

7. A prime example is China National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) expanded operations
in Sudan in the wake of Western withdrawals during that nation’s brutal civil war. See Erica Downs,
The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations, 3 CHINA SEC. 42, 58–62 (2007) (describing
CNPC’s role in Sudan).
8. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), OECD INVESTMENT POLICY REVIEWS:
CHINA, ENCOURAGING RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT 83 (2008) [hereinafter OECD REVIEW].
9. China’s top five trading partners—Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, and the
Republic of Congo—contribute more than eighty percent of Chinese imports from Africa. TRINH,
supra note 2, at 6.
10. INYAMBO MWANAWINA, AFRICAN ECON. RESEARCH CONSORTIUM, CHINA-AFRICA
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: THE CASE OF ZAMBIA 20 (2008), available at http://www.aercafrica.org/do
cuments/china_africa_relations/Zambia.pdf.
11. Jonathan Manthorpe, The Party's Over for Chinese in Africa, VANCOUVER SUN, Oct. 4,
2009. Lest we get too caught up in the bandwagon of commentators who frantically opine that China’s buying power is cutting other nations out of the picture, it is worth remembering that “China is
only the third largest market for Africa’s oil exports, accounting for 12.5%, behind the US (31.8%)
and EU (31.5%).” Tom Orlick, Hu Jintao: ‘Every time I go to Africa I feel like I am going home’,
CHINA TRANSLATED (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.chinatranslated.com/?p=178.
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nations receive many of the goods and services they need to raise
standards of living.12
Furthermore, Chinese corporations are able to provide these
services quickly and without the transparency and red tape that Western
corporations require for major OFDIs. These procedural and substantive
hurdles have, for better or worse, long prevented African nations from
carrying out some major projects, but African nations have now found
partners in Chinese business and government who are willing to make
deals without imposing stringent conditions related to human rights, the
environment, and corruption. While this approach does indeed increase
the availability of financing and investment, it very likely does so at the
expense of laborers and the environment.
B. Causes for Concern
While there are undoubtedly many Chinese companies operating
responsibly in Africa, the increased corporate activity raises new
environmental concerns. It is not that Chinese firms are any hungrier for
profits than their Western counterparts, but that they are doing business
under fundamentally different circumstances that pose unique threats to
the environment. This section identifies these unique concerns.13
1. China’s Environmental Track Record at Home
China’s limited success dealing with environmental issues
domestically does not bode well for its foreign operations.14 From
everyday air pollution that threatened to scuttle the 2008 Olympic
Games, to the high-profile benzene spill in the Songhua River that forced
over ten thousand residents to evacuate, China’s domestic struggles are
well-documented and need not be detailed here.15 Worth noting,
however, are a few of the major issues that hamper efforts to address
12. In fact, China may be better suited than entrenched Western MNCs to develop practical solutions for the problems facing African nations because China faces many of the same challenges.
Currently the worldwide leader in solar technologies, for example, China will be an essential partner
in the quest to provide rural African communities with electricity. Peter Bosshard, John Hopkins
Univ., China’s Environmental Footprint in Africa 4 (Sch. of Advanced Stud., Working Paper No.
01-08, 2008), available at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/sebin/i/f/BosshardWorkingPaper.pdf.
13. See id. at 5 (providing an abbreviated version of this discussion that was a primary source
for the issues laid out in this section).
14. See id. (“China’s domestic policies have prioritized economic growth over the protection
of the environment, with harrowing results.”); ELIZABETH ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK 248
(2004) (generalizing about the priorities and general mentality of many Chinese decision-makers).
15. See, e.g., Lisa A. Kirschner & Edward B. Grandy, Songhua River Spill: China’s Pollution
Crisis, 20 NAT. RESOURCE & ENV’T 66 (Spring 2006) (describing the Songhua spill in detail); see
generally ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 59–91 (thoroughly discussing the issues that plague environmental enforcement in China).
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pollution domestically because these are the problems that China risks
exporting as it expands into less-developed nations.
First, China’s environmental laws lack the level of detail required
for meaningful accountability and enforcement. Additionally,
government officials often fail to prioritize environmental enforcement
because polluting industries typically provide many local jobs and
government revenues.16 Even when local officials want to confront a
problem, they may be hindered by a lack of resources or authority, as
many governments have allies in higher reaches of government who can
prevent effective regulation.17 Finally, the system is permeated by a lack
of understanding of environmental issues and the associated health and
safety risks, making it difficult to convince anyone with authority to take
meaningful action.18 These problems also exist—often to an even worse
degree—in the host nations where Chinese corporations are establishing
so many operations, as described below.
2. Activities in Particularly Sensitive Places
Because of China’s late entry into the global resource market, its
companies are gaining access to many previously undeveloped areas.
Extractive industries typically carry above average environmental risks,
but Chinese investors are developing projects in remote and previously
untouched areas that are likely to be very sensitive to disturbances.19
While it may be possible to exploit resources in these areas responsibly,
China’s domestic track record does not give critics reason to believe that
it will value environmental concerns over financial gain as its
corporations continue to drill, chop, and mine the African backcountry.
This concern came to the forefront in 2006, when one of China’s
largest oil companies attempted to set up operations in Gabon’s Loango
National Park.20 Loango has been described as one of the last untouched
paradises on earth—a lush coastal preserve where extremely rare wildlife
species wander the beaches, blissfully unaware of humankind’s
existence. It is home to healthy populations of endangered lowland
gorillas and elephants, as well as manatees that breed in the crystal clear
waters off its coast. In 2006, scientists working in Loango reported that
16. ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 200.
17. ERICA DOWNS, BROOKINGS INST., BROOKINGS FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, ENERGY
SECURITY SERIES: CHINA 16−24 (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/
rc/reports/2006/12china/12china.pdf (noting, for example, that “[t]he general managers of China’s
[national oil companies] . . . have direct access to the country’s senior leadership . . . .”).
18. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 265–67.
19. Bosshard, supra note 12, at 5.
20. Chris Haslam, Oil Prospecting in Gabon, WILDLIFE EXTRA NEWS, Oct. 2006,
http://www.wildlifeextra.com/go/news/gabon-oil.html#cr.
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Sinopec contractors had entered the park and were employing destructive
exploratory tactics, including dynamiting gorilla habitat and a manatee
breeding site.21 One professor commented:
They're using dynamite, which is killing and scaring the wildlife,
sending the gorillas deeper into the forest and outside the protection
of the park where they risk becoming bushmeat. They're bulldozing
roads through the park, polluting the waters with chemicals and
slurry and hunting the wildlife to eat . . . . I don't want to forbid the
Gabonese from profiting from petrol but modern techniques exist,
like horizontal drilling that would allow the oil to be extracted
without setting foot in the park.22

Sinopec was ultimately forced out of Loango before they were able to
cause the extensive damage that conservationists and scientists feared,
but similar problems can occur wherever corporations move into
previously untouched lands and virgin forests. With Chinese acquisitions
rapidly expanding into these areas, immediate and irreparable damage is
likely.
3. Sensitive Nature of the Projects and Investments
Because China’s investments in Africa are so heavily concentrated
in natural resource extraction, Chinese corporations tend to have a
disproportionately large impact on the environment of host nations. For
example, mining and oil exploration entail significant levels of blasting,
seismic testing, and pollution, all of which can affect local ecosystems to
varying degrees.
The town of Kabwe, Zambia exemplifies the dangers of
irresponsible mining. This town, in the heart of the Zambia’s Copperbelt,
has for decades suffered from highly toxic lead dust and sulfur dioxide
fumes emitted from the smelters nearby.23 Barefoot children play on
mounds of poisonous waste, while citizens pick through the rubble
searching for scraps of metal they might be able to sell for a few
pennies.24 As a result, the level of lead in citizens’ blood is five to ten
times that which the U.S. government would consider safe.25 In spite of
all this, the Zambian government continues to welcome investors,

21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting Christophe Boesch).
23. Danstan Kaunda, Zambia Penalizes Chinese Investors for Pollution, VOICE OF AMERICA,
June 12, 2007, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1287300591.html.
24. Penny Dale, Zambia's Child Poisoning Tragedy, BBC, Nov. 6, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/africa/ 3241037.stm.
25. Id.
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offering tax breaks and waivers to anyone willing to invest in Zambian
mines.26
While not responsible for the appalling conditions that exist today,
Chinese firms have expanded into Zambia rapidly, often rekindling the
same problems that have earned Kabwe its title as the fourth mostpolluted place in the world.27 A mine run by Chiman Manufacturing,
Ltd., in particular, has been criticized repeatedly for failing to control air
and water pollution at its smelter and dumpsites. Though town officials
repeatedly “urged” Chiman to address the problems after it began
operations several years ago, Chiman’s smelter continued to pollute the
town with relative impunity.28
4. Lack of Environmental Safeguards in Associated Projects
Mines and smelters like those described above are obvious
pollution sources. However, Chinese companies are often involved in
massive construction projects that may result in less apparent
environmental impacts. Companies carry out these projects both to
facilitate the extractive process and as a form of compensation for the
right to operate in the host counties, an arrangement often referred to as
“oil-for-infrastructure.”29 In September 2007, for example, China agreed
to finance thousands of miles of roads and railways in Congo in
exchange for 10 million metric tons of copper and 600,000 tons of
cobalt.30 These oil-for-infrastructure contracts are popular with local
governments because they provide much needed infrastructure and
construction jobs.31
However, the projects often have negative consequences that are
not adequately considered.32 Traditionally, developing nations relied
26. Chris Mfula, Zambia Won’t Reintroduce High Mine Taxes, REUTERS, Dec.12, 2009,
http://af.reuters.com/article/zambiaNews/idAFGEE5BB09G20091212. The tax incentives are still in
place.
27. Kabwe, Africa's Most Toxic City, IRIN NEWS, Nov. 9, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/Repo
rt.aspx?ReportId=61521. The three cities topping the list of the world's most toxic sites ahead of
Kabwe are Chernobyl, Dzerzhinsk (a Russian, Cold War-era chemical weapons production facility),
and Haina, Dominican Republic, “where emissions from an old car battery smelter have caused
almost the entire population of 85,000 to suffer from lead poisoning.” Id.
28. Reduce Air Pollution, Chinese Firm Urged, THE TIMES OF ZAMBIA, Feb. 11, 2008,
http://allafrica.com/stories/200802110293.html.
29. New Trends in Financing Infrastructure, FUTURE CHALLENGES (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://futurechallenges.org/searchlight/new-trends-in-financing-infrastructure/.
30. GLOBAL WITNESS, CHINA AND CONGO: FRIENDS IN NEED, A REPORT ON THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO 9 (Mar. 2011), http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/friends
_in_need_en_lr.pdf.
31. See FUTURE CHALLENGES, supra note 29.
32. See MWANAWINA, supra note 10, at 10–11 (describing the lack of coordination among bureaucratic officials and contractors and the poor construction that results).
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upon international lending institutions to finance the large scale projects
now being built or financed by the Chinese. These international
institutions, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the
World Bank Group, have adopted environmental guidelines that projects
must meet in order to receive financing. Chinese investors and suppliers
often do not have guidelines or standards that are consistent with
international standards.33 Consequently, many of these projects never
receive the kind of environmental review that international institutions
require, such as environmental impact assessments (EIAs).34
On the other hand, the transparency and environmental standards
that Western institutions tend to enforce have prevented many African
projects from going forward.35 By lowering or eliminating these
standards, Chinese corporations and financiers allow African leaders to
pursue projects they believe will help their communities.36 From the
African perspective, this allows leaders to achieve their development
goals with few strings attached.37
II. LEGAL DIFFICULTIES REGARDING ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION
BY FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
It is clear that the environmental consequences of corporate
activities abroad can lead to serious problems for local residents and
ecosystems. Less clear is how those affected can successfully intervene
to stop or mitigate the damage, or to seek compensation after the fact.
Traditional legal regimes are generally inadequate for dealing with
instances of malfeasance by both Chinese and multinational corporations
(MNCs).
A. Domestic Law in Host Nations
Although all foreign investors are subject to the control of the host
State, it is often very difficult to enforce environmental laws against
33. Bosshard, supra note 12, at 5.
34. GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 30, at 35.
35. MWANAWINA, supra note 10, at 21 (“All Zambia[n] agreements with China are confidential, making them closed to public scrutiny and at variance with both China’s and Zambia’s increased commitment to openness and public transparency and accountability.”).
36. Id. at 6 (specifically noting that the Chinese traditionally fund Zambian “projects [that]
other donors are not interested in”).
37. See Bosshard, supra note 12, at 6–8. This is how the Sudanese government, for example,
finally obtained financing to build the Merowe Dam on the Nile, a project that was uniformly rejected by major Western financiers because of its severe social and environmental impacts. Believing
that the potential benefits of the project were worth the risks, the Sudanese government eventually
received funding from China’s Ex-Im Bank, the largest foreign aid bank in China, and hired China
International Water and Electric Corporation to build the dam. The closed-door planning process
resulted in several blatant breaches of accepted international environmental standards.

2012]

Feeding the Dragon

353

foreign firms in developing nations.38 Prior to entering the market,
foreign firms must comply with all national foreign investment laws
governing entry, “which not only provide for guarantees against
expropriation[,] . . . dispute settlement, and tax and non-tax incentives,
but also detail a screening process of entry through administrative
agencies and often require a feasibility study . . . [which] may include an
EIA.”39 During the life of the project, investing companies must also
continue to “abide by all national laws and regulations—including
environmental ones, as the investor voluntarily subjects himself to
regime of the host State by making entry into it.”40 Nevertheless,
problems arise during both phases.
1. Compromises at Entry into the Market
The fierce competition for investment in developing countries can
significantly affect the terms under which investors operate. First,
national entry regulations are often lax or vague.41 Even basic
requirements, such as EIAs, may be little more than mere formalities or
overlooked entirely.42 Second, the host nation’s desire for capital
investment generally puts the potential investor at a substantial
bargaining advantage. During negotiations, a potential investor may
extract from the host nation numerous contractual guarantees that protect
the investor’s money and property, but which can prevent the host nation
from enforcing or enacting meaningful environmental standards.43

38. ELISA MORGERA, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 25 (2009).
39. Id. at 26.
40. Id.
41. MWANAWINA, supra note 10, at 10 (stating unequivocally that Zambia “lacks laws and
systems which are results oriented and accountable”).
42. While most nations appear to have laws that require EIAs for major projects, few have any
authoritative or meaningful guidelines for these reports, so it is not unusual for an EIA to be inadequate or even entirely inaccurate. Objective oversight or review by third parties is not required, and
internal review by a host State’s environmental officials is not guaranteed even when required by
local law. See Bosshard, supra note 12, at 7 (describing the shortcomings in the Sudanese dam environmental impact assessment).
43. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 27. Even beyond these specific agreements, there are international conventions dealing with the protection of alien property, and expropriation of assets is considered a breach of customary international law. It is important to note that these issues are regularly
enforced at an international level: investor protections have “been gradually extended from tangible
assets to cover . . . other investors’ rights, thus limiting the sovereignty of host States over their
natural resources, and enlarging the sphere of corporate interests protected at the international level.”
Id. at 51. This begs the question of why wealthy international investors have been given forums and
mechanisms to protect their investments, while poor host nations have no comparable way to protect
their communities from environmental destruction.
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An example of one seemingly innocuous provision with potentially
far-reaching environmental consequences is the “stabilization clause.”44
Stabilization clauses “seek to freeze the laws of the host State as at the
time of entry so that the operating conditions of the foreign investment
process will remain constant throughout the life of the foreign
investment contract.”45 Such contractual provisions severely restrict the
right of the host nation to update, enact, or enforce environmental laws
that might apply to the foreign investors’ operations.46
2. Lack of Local Enforcement
Host State legal systems often do not have adequate mechanisms
for ensuring that foreign firms operate in an environmentally responsible
way. Local officials rarely have any incentive to crack down on
industrial polluters because these companies are often the financial
lifeblood of the community, providing much of the tax base and
employment in the area.47 In some nations, concessions from these
MNCs constitute a significant portion of the national GDP, so there is
incentive to look the other way.48 Even when officials act in good faith,
they may be hampered by a lack of enforcement resources, technological
ability, and awareness of risks.49 Finally, the potential legal
consequences stemming from violations of regulations that are enforced
are often insufficient to motivate compliance.
3. Difficulty of Pursuing a Legal Claim
Compounding the problem are numerous obstacles that prevent
plaintiffs from successfully asserting civil claims in response to
environmental harm. Plaintiffs may lack standing to challenge a general
harm inflicted on a region, particularly when the harms alleged are not
specific to the individual or causation is difficult to prove.50 What cause
44. Id. at 27.
45. Id.
46. Even when this might otherwise be construed as a non-compensable regulatory taking, recent international law cases have indicated that an environmental regulation can, in some cases,
“constitute an act ‘tantamount to expropriation.’ ” Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000), 40 ILM 35.
47. MWANAWINA, supra note 10, at 10 (noting that Zambia, at least, “is a place where you
keep your job by not doing it.”).
48. As an example, a Canadian MNC operating a gold mine in Guyana provided twenty percent of that nation’s GDP in 1995 when it was sued for damages related to a massive spill into Guyana’s Essequibo River. The Canadian court hearing the case acknowledged serious concerns regarding the fairness of proceedings involving such an influential entity in Guyana. Recheres Internacionales Quebec v. Cambior Inc., 1998 QJ N2554 (QL).
49. MWANAWINA, supra note 10, at 10.
50. Id. at 29.
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of action, for example, could a concerned citizen have brought to try to
stop Sinopec’s blasting in Loango National Park?
Even if local plaintiffs succeed in asserting a claim, they are usually
underfunded and dependent upon legal aid that may not be available.51
Chinese multinationals, on the other hand, have the resources to defend
themselves and are likely to structure their deals in ways that limit
liability. A host nation’s court may not be able to assert jurisdiction over
a Chinese parent company at all, and even it did, judgments would be
difficult to enforce either in the host nation or in China.52 As a practical
matter, local plaintiffs are simply unlikely to obtain adequate remedies or
damages from Chinese corporations in host nation courts.
B. Foreign Direct Liability
Because redressing environmental harms can be particularly
difficult in host nations, it is sometimes more effective for the home
State to regulate its corporations’ activities abroad, which is known as
foreign direct liability. This concept encompasses both extraterritorial
regulation, wherein subsidiaries acting abroad are forced to abide by the
laws of the home State, and also home State liability, which allows host
nation citizens to seek damages from foreign corporations in the
corporation’s home State.53
1. Extraterritorial Regulation
There are several practical difficulties with applying home State
law to activities occurring abroad. First, it is important to remember that
home States are permitted to exercise jurisdiction over their MNCs
abroad.54 Even developing nations that typically object to international
interference in domestic affairs, such as China and India, have
occasionally expressed support for the idea that a MNC’s home
government “should also undertake obligations, including . . . ensur[ing]
that the investor’s behavior and practices are in line with and contribute
to the interests and development of policies of the host [State].”55 U.N.
51. ALICE PALMER, FOUND. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW & DEV., COMMUNITY REDRESS
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 8 (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.field.org.uk/files/Com
munity_redress.pdf.
52. Id. at 10.
53. DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 131.
54. See Christen Broecker, “Better the Devil You Know”: Home State Approaches to Transnational Corporate Accountability, 41 J. INT’L L. & POL. 159, 178–79 (2008) (briefly describing the
legitimate bases for extraterritorial regulation).
55. World Trade Organization, Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment: Communication from China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe—Investors’
and Home Governments’ Obligations, WTO Doc WT/WGTI/W/152 (2002); see also MORGERA,
AND
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Special Representative John Ruggie, the head of U.N. initiatives
regarding transnational corporations and human rights, has also indicated
“that extraterritorial regulation by home States of TNCs headquartered in
their territories is permissible under international law and may even be
desirable in some circumstances.”56
Nevertheless, the fact that such regulation is permissible does not
make it particularly practical. Many significant obstacles impede a home
State’s ability to oversee corporate activities effectively in foreign states.
First, the host State may view such intervention in its internal affairs
with suspicion and could even prevent the home State from exercising
effective control by asserting its own right to national sovereignty.57
Second, a host nation that permits such intrusion risks establishing a
system in which MNCs in the same industry operate “subject to different
environmental regulations depending on their country of origin.”58 The
host country would face tremendous regulatory and enforcement
challenges in such a system.
On the other hand, the home nation may not exercise effective
control either. In a nation like China, for example, competing
bureaucratic interests, devolved enforcement authority, lack of interest
and knowledge on environmental issues, and vague laws all conspire to
prevent effective regulation of foreign activities.59 Courts around the
world have been extremely reluctant to exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction in environmental damage cases, precisely because the issues
involved are generally so local in nature.60 Given the difficulties that
plague environmental enforcement within China, it is particularly
difficult to imagine the Chinese government creating or exercising
effective enforcement mechanisms that could stem pollution and
resource damage in distant and less developed nations. On a deeper
level, there is very little culture of compliance within China, nor any
meaningful sense of responsibility for corporate actions abroad.61 This
mentality poses a difficult obstacle for effective home State regulation.
supra note 38, at 30–34 (describing both the theoretical and practical problems with home State
control and extraterritoriality).
56. Broecker, supra note 54, at 177 (citing Mr. Ruggie).
57. PALMER, supra note 51, at 12.
58. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 31.
59. See generally ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 59-91(thoroughly examining the ineffectiveness
of China’s environmental laws and general disinterest in environmental policy).
60. See Jennifer. K Rankin, U.S. Laws in the Rainforest: Can a U.S. Court Find Liability for
Extraterritorial Pollution Caused by a US Corporation? An Analysis of Aguindo v. Texaco, Inc., 18
BC INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 251 (1995) (noting the aversion that U.S. courts seem to have
against recognizing extraterritorial jurisdictional claims in environmental cases).
61. LI JUNHAI, CHINESE ACAD. OF SOC. SCI., PHILOSOPHY AND APPROACHES TO STRENGTHEN
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA 13; see also Dan Haglund, Regulating FDI in Weak African
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2. Home State Liability
Home State liability is often used as a method of last resort for
complainants in host States who have suffered harm but have not been
able to pursue their claims in their own nation’s courts.62 Foreign citizens
may bring claims against Chinese corporations in Chinese courts, but
considering the difficulty that domestic plaintiffs have collecting
damages for environmental harms, such a suit would not be likely to
succeed. Simply getting access to legal assistance within China from faroff African nations would be difficult. Furthermore, procedural hurdles
often keep plaintiffs from even making it past the pleadings stage.63 If
plaintiffs make it to the courtroom, proving the case against the Chinese
corporation could be impossible when the evidence needed “is in the
hands of the [corporation] or of a host State unwilling to cooperate.”64
Even where a plaintiff can prove liability, Chinese courts may not be
willing to hold Chinese firms responsible in cases where major SOEs are
involved or when foreign subsidiaries caused the destruction.65 Finally,
courts may be reluctant to impose liability when foreign relations issues
are involved, as they almost always are in Sino-African resource
acquisition projects.66

States: A Case Study of Chinese Copper Mining in Zambia, 46 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 547, 559 (2008)
(recounting the forceful argument of a Chinese official in Zambia “that Chinese companies must
simply follow local laws, and that responsibility for identification and sanctioning of noncompliance should rest with the Zambian government”).
62. PALMER, supra note 51, at 10. This is the principle that underlies the United State’s Alien
Torts Claim Act, which provides a forum for suits alleging violations of international law by those
who cannot obtain justice elsewhere. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (also known as the Alien Tort Statute).
63. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 33.
64. Id.
65. Collecting from a Chinese parent company on judgments rendered against its foreign subsidiaries poses unique problems as well. While “piercing the corporate veil” is not easy in Western
nations, it is even more difficult in China. Under the Companies Law of 2005, the parent company is
considered a shareholder of its subsidiaries, but it is not held liable for the subsidiary’s judgment
debts unless two conditions are met. First, the plaintiff must show that that the parent company
shareholder has attempted to “[evade] the payment of its debts by abusing the independent status of
legal person or the shareholder’s limited liabilities.” Art. 20. This subjective standard of fault is
exceptionally difficult to prove. Second, the plaintiff must show that the subsidiary’s action has
“seriously injure[d] the interests of [a] creditor . . . .” Art. 64. This amorphous requirement is not
only difficult to prove, but gives the judge considerable discretion in deciding whether to hold a
parent company liable. Additionally, the creditor must also become involved in the case in order to
prove this element. Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) (China), available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/statelaws/200904/t20090428_102712.htm.
66. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 33.

358

Seattle Journal of Environmental Law

[Vol. 2:343

III. LAW AND REGULATORY CONTROL OF OFDI AND OPERATIONS
ABROAD
The discussion thus far has exposed some of the difficulties of
dealing with destructive acts by multinationals in general and Chinese
corporations in particular. The remainder of this article will examine this
problem in the specific context of the Chinese government and related
institutions that are involved with Chinese corporate actors around the
globe.
The Chinese government already has an elaborate regulatory system
in place to oversee foreign investments, but this system focuses primarily
on commercial and strategic viability, rather than environmental
oversight and enforcement. Nevertheless, with the government already
so deeply involved in foreign investment projects, it could exercise more
effective and meaningful oversight if it chose to do so. This section
describes the Chinese entities involved in outward foreign direct
investment (OFDI) regulation and the ways that environmental concerns
are incorporated into their decision making.
A. National Development and Reform Commission
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), an
agency under the State Council, is a macroeconomic planning entity
charged with managing general economic policy.67 Depending on the
particulars of an OFDI project, it may also review and approve
individual proposals.68 In order for the NDRC to approve a project, it
must find that the project will comply with domestic laws, regulations,
and policies, and “comply with the demands of sustainable development
of the economy and society . . . .”69 Since these vague terms are
undefined, however, such a finding may not ultimately require much by
way of actual evidence that the project will operate sustainably. Finally,
given NDRC’s macroeconomic focus, NDRC does not seem to
67. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 87.
68. Id. at 83.
69. Article 18 of The Interim Measures for the Administration, Examination and Approval of
Overseas Investment Projects provides:
The requirements for the project that shall be examined and approved by the National Development and Reform Commission are as follows: (1) it shall abide by the laws
and regulations of the state and the industrial policies, not do harm to the sovereignty,
safety and public interests of the state and not violate the rules of international law; (2) it
shall comply with the demands of sustainable development of the economy and society
and be helpful to the development of strategic resources required for developing the national economy . . . .
The Interim Measures for the Administration, Examination and Approval of Overseas Investment
Projects (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n, Oct. 9, 2004) (China), available at
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/timftaoeaaotoip1038/.
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emphasize environmental issues in its review process. In most respects,
its approval process and criteria are largely similar to that of the Ministry
of Commerce, described below, except that NDRC is less likely to delve
into the technical details and analysis of specific projects.
B. MOFCOM
The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM, or sometimes MOC) is
responsible for “setting administrative measures and specific policies,
guiding China’s overseas investment, approving each OFDI proposal,
and recording OFDI data.”70 MOFCOM and NDRC’s review criteria
may be similar, but MOFCOM tends to review projects in more specific
detail, both with regards to economic viability and operations in the host
country.71 Overseas investors must submit various documents disclosing
financial details and attesting that projects will comply with local laws
and be compatible with Chinese strategic interests. MOFCOM also
administers a database regarding local laws in nations where Chinese
businesses operate in an effort to help businesses succeed and comply
with local laws.72
MOFCOM’s authority is further split among several departments
tasked with overseeing different aspects of foreign economic activity.
The Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation (DFEC) is charged
with regulating all Chinese companies operating overseas and has the
authority to punish corporations that violate MOFCOM regulations or
Chinese laws.73 The Department of Foreign Aid (DFA) administers
China’s aid projects, including concessional loans and oil-forinfrastructure projects. In this role, DFA is responsible for approving
Chinese contractors and “takes direct responsibility for the safety and
quality of construction in China’s aid projects.”74
All this project-level involvement puts MOFCOM and its
departments in a good position to exercise oversight of OFDI, but this
capacity is underutilized in the environmental context for a variety of
reasons. Most importantly, MOFCOM has incompatibly conflicting
responsibilities because it is charged with both helping Chinese
companies succeed in their overseas business ventures and with
regulating them. As long as MOFCOM and the State Council’s primary
interest continues to be economic development, regulatory enforcement
70. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 87.
71. Id. at 87–88.
72. Id. at 89, 93.
73. Bates Gill & James Reilly, The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa, WASH. Q., Summer
2007, at 42.
74. Id. at 43.
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is unlikely to emanate from MOFCOM itself in all but the most
egregious cases. Furthermore, MOFCOM does not have direct authority
over any of the SOEs operating abroad, so it cannot take effective action
against these companies in most cases.75
C. Economic and Commercial Counselor
The Chinese embassy in each host nation also has an Economic and
Commercial Counselor (ECC) office that manages economic links
between the host nation and China. The ECC has a unique role in OFDI
policy because it is sometimes the only office in a position to oversee
projects from beginning to end, but occupies a sort of no-man’s land in
the bureaucracy that leaves it at once independent from oversight, yet
powerless in its own right. On one hand, the ECC is not directly subject
to the administrative authority of any ministry that might seek to enhance
environmental compliance, such as MEP or MOFCOM (which does not
have administrative authority over the ECC, in spite of their close
relationship), so it need not enforce any other department’s decision if it
chooses not to do so.76 On the other hand, the ECC is responsible for
providing MOFCOM with relevant information regarding any proposed
project,77 including an opinion regarding the proposal’s impacts “on the
bilateral political, economic and trade relationships.”78 Yet, the ECC has
no authority to do anything if its opinion is negative. The ECC also helps
inform each company of the laws that apply to it in any given situation.
This role draws significantly upon MOFCOM’s expertise with the
financial and legal requirements in each host nation, but again ECC’s
75. Id. at 44–45.
76. To those who are less familiar with the workings of Chinese bureaucracy, or who accept
the “China, Inc.” model that portrays Chinese government and business interests as a unified force,
this idea of competing bureaucracies may seem strange. However, the truth is that turf wars between
ministries and with the central government are common, and regulating businesses is often more
difficult than people presume. For further discussion of the complexities of the Chinese bureaucracy
with regards to OFDI and the energy sector in particular, see generally Gill & Reilly, supra note 73
and DOWNS, supra note 17 at 16–39.
77. Under Articles 10 and 11 of The Measures for Overseas Investment Management,
MOFCOM must solicit the ECC’s opinion regarding “the basic information on the investment and
other relevant information” before MOFCOM can approve a proposed project. The Measures for
Overseas Investment Management (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Mar. 16, 2009)
(China), available at http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/200904/t20090402_202192.html.
78. Article 11 states:
The [economic and trade counselor’s office of the] embassy or consulate of China in the
foreign country or region shall put forward its opinion in such respects as the security status of the host country and the impact of the investment on the bilateral political, economic and trade relationships, and make a reply within 10 workdays after receiving the
letter of request for opinion.
Id.
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role is limited to information sharing.79 Finally, like MOFCOM, the ECC
has no direct lines of authority over Chinese corporations in Africa.80
In spite of these handicaps, the ECC is in a position to observe both
potential and actual environmental effects in projects. In fact, it is
arguably required to do so. For example, the ECC’s assessment of
probable trade effects could include a full report of a project’s potential
environmental impacts since adverse effects to host nation environments
can easily lead to strained relations. However, the ECC must file its
opinion on the project within ten days of receiving a request from
MOFCOM, which is not enough time to conduct a thorough
environmental evaluation.81 Furthermore, although the ECC is tasked
with helping Chinese corporations increase their knowledge and
compliance with host State laws, it has neither the environmental
expertise nor the manpower to monitor operations. The ECC office in
Zambia, for example, had only six staff members in 2007 when the
Chiman mining problems occurred.82
D. SASAC
The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC) either owns or holds a controlling share of stocks
in all of China’s State-owned entities (SOEs).83 Because the SOEs carry
out the vast majority of resource acquisition OFDI from China into
Africa, SASAC is a key player in decisions regarding corporate
operations in host nations.84 SASAC’s role is virtually indistinguishable
from that of a typical managing shareholder in that its sole concern is in
maximizing the economic performance of its companies.85 This gives
SASAC every incentive to avoid costs associated with environmental
compliance. This is particularly problematic because SASAC is not
effectively checked by any other ministries with competing interests. As
an organ of the State Council, SASAC’s bureaucratic ranking is
equivalent to any of the ministries that might try to exert authority over
SOEs, so State-owned corporations enjoy the privilege of influencing

79. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 93.
80. Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 45, 47; see also DOWNS, supra note 17, at 21–24 (describing some of the ways officers avoid responsibility or circumvent bureaucratic oversight).
81. The Measures for Overseas Investment Management, supra note 77, at Art. 11.
82. Haglund, supra note 61, at 557 (as of 2007).
83. Id. at 42.
84. Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 44 (noting that because “[p]rovince-level SOEs make up
approximately 88 percent of all Chinese firms investing abroad” provincial governments are key
players “in China’s corporate engagement strategy overseas”).
85. Id. at 42.
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both the implementation and enforcement of regulations that affect
them.86
This is not to say that SASAC thwarts every attempt to regulate
SOE conduct. It recently issued several directives ostensibly intended to
raise the level of SOE conduct. The Guiding Opinion on Fulfilling Social
Responsibilities by Central Enterprises (December 2007), for example,
sets forth lofty goals for sustainably conducting business within China,
including establishing norms for evaluating and reporting corporate
social responsibilities.87 The Guiding Opinion also specifically
recognizes that good corporate citizenship is increasingly important for
fostering international political and economic relationships and
developing an image of responsibility for central enterprises.88
Accordingly, many of China’s largest SOEs in Africa have adopted
corporate codes of conduct and at least nominally committed themselves
to international corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives like the
U.N. Global Compact.89 Some enterprises have even implemented
external auditing procedures that are designed to demonstrate
compliance with international standards and meet the expectations of
foreign investors or partners.90 While such voluntary initiatives are
commendable, they are no substitute for effective governmental
regulation and oversight.
E. Financial Institutions
China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank (ExIm Bank) are China’s two major State-owned banks that deal with
foreign investment and aid projects. As the primary funding source for
the kinds of development projects we have discussed, these financial
institutions often have the most direct contact with the operating details
of specific projects. CDB is responsible for managing the China Africa
Development Fund, which makes approximately $5 billion available for
increasing agricultural and manufacturing investments in ongoing
Chinese projects in Africa.91
86. Id.; see also DOWNS, supra note 17, at 21–24 (discussing the relationship of the oil companies to the government).
87. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 190–91; see also id. at 225–35 (full text of the Guiding
Opinion).
88. Id. at 191.
89. UNITED NATIONS, PAMPHLET, THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT (2011), available
at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/GC_brochure_FINAL.pdf. To see
what companies are members of the Global Compact, see http://www.unglobalcompact.org/participa
nts/search.
90. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 214.
91. Id. at 117.
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The Ex-Im Bank, however, is the most important bank in African
policy, holding an outstanding loan balance of at least $7 billion for
African projects, which account for nearly twenty percent of its total
business.92 Ex-Im Bank coordinates with MOFCOM to arrange bidding
for all of China’s official economic aid projects, provides low-rate loans
to African governments for aid programs, and encourages Chinese firms
to invest in Africa through export credits and loans for overseas projects,
often with direct support from government officials.93 The vast majority
of these projects are in the infrastructure development sectors, including
“dams, hydropower, thermal nuclear power plants, oil facilities, copper
mines, and railways.”94 Ex-Im Bank reportedly made approximately $20
billion available for further projects in Africa in 2008–2010.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN PROMOTING ENVIRONMENTALLY
RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT
Although the governmental structure described above does not
appear to provide sufficient oversight, the Chinese government has
shown an increased interest in promoting corporate environmental and
social responsibility. Just as the government has acknowledged the need
for better environmental protection domestically over the last decade, it
seems to have realized that rampant destruction in African host nations is
unsustainable as both an environmental and a commercial practice. Each
of the governmental bodies detailed in the previous section has reason to
help ensure that Chinese corporations conduct business in
environmentally responsible ways, even if it comes at some expense.
At the national level, the Central Government has at least nominally
recognized that it is not in China’s long term interest to allow its
companies to wreak havoc on the environments of host nations.95 Such
actions contribute to an already somewhat negative image of China as a
player in the international business community, which can be damaging
in several ways. First, wealthier Western corporations are increasingly
conscious of public perceptions regarding their corporate
responsibility.96 Major companies are therefore less willing to be
associated with high profile environmental destruction, even if the

92. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 115.
93. Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 43.
94. Id.
95. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 186.
96. See, e.g., Karin Buhmann, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Current Issues and
Their Relevance for Implementation of Law, 22 COPENHAGEN J. ASIAN STUD. 62, 83 (2005) (“Low
respect for CSR is increasingly recognized as a risk for corporate investment and reputation.”).
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actions are perpetrated by suppliers or foreign partners.97 This trend
could make it increasingly difficult for China to attract foreign
investment and forge partnerships with the wealthy corporations that will
help ensure China’s economic prosperity in the future.98 Developing
environmentally responsible operations and implementing credible
mechanisms to report on corporate responsibility can help Chinese
suppliers and manufacturers secure and retain business from
international customers.
Second, the perception that Chinese businesses are destructive to
host nations makes it less likely that other nations will open their doors
to Chinese corporations. This not only hurts immediate business interests
but also affects China’s long term resource goals.99 Rampant
environmental destruction in host nations may cause such resentment
that foreign governments are forced to address the problems through
more stringent regulations. In the most egregious cases, a host nation
may react more harshly still, as Sierra Leone did when it banned timber
exports entirely at the beginning of 2010.100 Such backlash could imperil
long term relations with the supplier nations that are vital to China’s
continued growth and development. So while NDRC and MOFCOM, for
example, may not presently be interested in environmental regulation,
they must come to realize that their common goal of increased economic
prosperity can only be achieved by ensuring a certain level of
responsible conduct.101
Accordingly, the government has adopted an active posture in
urging corporations to conduct their operations abroad responsibly. The
latest version of the national Company Law includes a requirement that
97. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 157 (quoting Chinese scholar Wang Zhile, who points out
that “[i]international society will not apply lower standards to Chinese corporations overseas simply
because they are from a developing country”).
98. Id. at 162 (“[M]ultinationals may prefer to source items from suppliers deemed capable of
implementing international standards of corporate conduct.”).
99. DANIEL H. ROSEN & THILO HANEMANN, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., CHINA’S
CHANGING OUTBOUND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROFILE: DRIVERS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS (2009) (“Shielding pariah-state governments or providing ‘no strings attached’ loans
to the developing world might help some of the established OFDI players, but it hurts the reputation
of China’s firms among consumers and thus harms the interest of China’s next generation of OFDI
investors.”).
100. While not directly blaming any specific entities for the destruction, Sierra Leone officials
noted that “tens of millions of dollars’ worth of logs were smuggled out of the country to Middle
Eastern and Southeast Asian countries . . . .” Rhett A. Butler, Sierra Leone Cracks Down on Illegal
Logging by Banning Log Exports, MONGABAY, Jan. 2, 2010, http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0102sierra_leone.html.
101. ROSEN & HANEMANN, supra note 99, at 12 (“Anti-Chinese sentiment in host countries
and concerns articulated by third-country governments and nongovernmental organizations have
forced an internal debate between the steward of China’s new-found soft power, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and those concerned only with maximizing overseas access.”).
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companies adhere to notions of social and business morality.102 China
has also significantly increased its participation and visibility in regional
and international programs aimed at fostering corporate responsibility.103
The government has focused on encouraging businesses to work
voluntarily toward higher standards of CSR, perhaps because this “is
easier than relying on regulations that the State lacks the administrative
capacity to enforce and that, if enforced, would reduce global
competitiveness.”104 There also appears to be a heightened expectation
that companies actually make efforts to abide by the commitments of
such programs, as opposed to simply signing onto them.105 While this
effort is commendable in many respects, Chinese notions of CSR must
begin to include responsible conduct in the supply chain, rather than only
in the immediate production process.
V. OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
A. Structural Improvement
The current regulatory structure may be unwieldy and inefficient,
but it does allow the government several opportunities to review and
regulate environmental impacts associated with OFDI. Even where the
process currently purports to take environmental considerations into
account, it would benefit from increased reference to objective standards.
This final section presents an analysis of several tools that can be
employed to help Chinese companies address environmental issues in
foreign nations.
1. Consolidate Oversight Authority
The problems of the bureaucracy described above are clear. Each of
the bodies mentioned has a different mission and different priorities
regarding overseas investments. SASAC seeks, for example, to
maximize profits, just as any corporate stakeholder does.106 This purpose
can easily conflict with the goals of MOFCOM, which is involved at the
macro level in approving and facilitating projects that are consistent with

102. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 144.
103. Id. at 202–08 (describing several recent and ongoing efforts).
104. Editorial: ‘CSR’ Will Not Be Delivered by Businesses Alone, CHINA DEV. BRIEF, Nov. 4,
2005, www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/287.
105. The enzyme producing company Novozymes China and mining company Lafarge, for example, have supported significant domestic projects by the Chinese chapter of the World Wildlife
Federation (WWF), “partly in response to growing expectations from the Chinese government.”
Buhmann, supra note 96, at 72.
106. Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 42.
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larger policy goals.107 Even within these bodies, the State Council has
decentralized much authority to lower levels, thereby increasing the
number of competing offices involved in OFDI approval and
oversight.108 As a result, no single entity is responsible for evaluating and
monitoring environmental impacts, nor is it clear who should be
responsible for addressing issues as they arise. This systemic problem
makes it extremely difficult to conceive of a solution within the current
governmental structure.
While we recognize that it is unrealistic to expect wholesale
changes to this bureaucracy, the preferred solution is to empower a
single governmental body to administer and regulate the environmental
issues associated with foreign investment projects. Just as the elevation
of SEPA to a ministry-level body has greatly expanded its influence
domestically,109 designating one department within the Chinese
government to exercise control over all environmental impacts abroad
would greatly increase the efficacy of the regulatory power. None of the
current agencies is specifically responsible for reviewing and overseeing
the environmental aspects of these projects, so the government should
either establish a new department or designate an existing one to assume
this role.
The best solution is to authorize a department within MEP to
exercise authority abroad and to operate independently of the economic
agencies that are currently involved in the process. It would be virtually
impossible to force any real changes in corporate practices abroad
without MEP’s involvement. MEP is the only existing ministry with the
expertise to monitor projects in any meaningful sense. Additionally,
MEP’s exclusive duty is to oversee environmental issues, so it is the only
agency that could begin to counteract the influence of the economic
agencies that currently dominate the process. Finally, MEP’s ministrylevel status makes it at least theoretically capable of exercising authority
over the corporate entities it would regulate. If MEP were specifically
charged with regulating foreign investment projects, it would be able to
contend with the economic agencies’ efforts to maximize profits and
business relationships in host nations.110
107. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 87.
108. Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 44 (“China relies heavily on coordination among a complex array of corporations and government bureaucracies to achieve its policy objectives in Africa.
These companies are ranked at city, province, and national levels and are responsible to different
bureaucracies, impeding effective government oversight.”).
109. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 263.
110. Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 44 (“Finally, the interests of Chinese corporations and
their supporting bureaucratic agencies of the Chinese government may conflict with the interests of
other Chinese government bureaucratic actors also engaged in Africa.”).
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Currently, MEP is technically authorized to dispatch counselors
abroad, but it needs the permission of both the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the State Council in order to do so.111 This impedes its
independence and ability to maintain a presence where it is needed. MEP
should be independently authorized to establish offices alongside the
ECC and DFEC in the nations where Chinese businesses operate so that
it is in a position to exercise oversight of environmental issues in these
host nations.
The same enforcement difficulties that plague MEP domestically
would be present in foreign offices on an even larger scale.112 However,
the current situation allows corporate and economic interests to exercise
virtually unfettered control over foreign operations. Any effort that
brings environmental experts and policies into the foreign regulatory
structure would be an improvement over the status quo.
2. Meaningful Review and Oversight Within the Current Structure
In the absence of a newly-authorized foreign division of MEP, there
are other ways that current bureaucratic procedures could better address
the environmental impacts of foreign projects. Within the current
structure, MOFCOM and its DFEC seem best-positioned to provide
substantive environmental review of investment projects. DFEC must
approve projects at an operational level,113 which requires it
(theoretically, at least) to engage in an analysis of the project itself and
the environment—both physical and legal—of its proposed location.
DFEC also supposedly possesses the authority to punish firms that do
not adhere to MOFCOM regulations and to Chinese law,114 so DFEC
should be able to enforce requirements both before and during overseas
investment projects.
MOFCOM already appears to be accepting increased responsibility
for environmental issues pertaining to foreign projects, both in terms of
information sharing and oversight. In order to help Chinese companies
comply with local laws, MOFCOM administers a database of laws in
every nation with which China enjoys significant economic ties,

111. This rule is distilled from the directions contained in The Working Rules of the State
Council, Art. 39; The Regulation on the Main Functions and Staffing of the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China, Art. 16-4; and The Law of China on Diplomatic Personnel Stationed
Abroad, Art. 24-3.
112. Such problems include “the limitations of bureaucratic capacity, geographical distance,
and companies’ incentives to hide information,” all of which make it very difficult to “[access]
timely information sufficient for oversight.” Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 44.
113. Id. at 42–44.
114. Id. at 42.
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including environmental laws.115 While these laws may not be rigorous
enough to prevent environmental degradation in all situations,
MOFCOM’s efforts at least indicate a willingness to help companies
comply with these laws. Increased consultations between operators and
MOFCOM officials should be encouraged so that companies can use this
information to guide development choices.
More importantly, MOFCOM has begun to coordinate with other
bodies to require more responsible corporate conduct. For example,
SEPA (now MEP) and MOFCOM issued a circular in October 2007 that
instituted a “green trade policy” intended to increase domestic penalties
for Chinese enterprises that have violated environmental laws and
regulations within China.116 Under this policy, the government has the
power to severely restrict a business’s ability to engage in export activity
and foreign trade if the business violates Chinese environmental
regulations and laws.117 This sort of policy promotes cooperation
between agencies and shows that China is capable of using trade
restrictions as an enforcement tool against polluting industries. If a
comparable regulation applied to industries operating outside of China,
those firms would have increased incentives to obey the laws and behave
responsibly. The threat of losing import/export licenses or government
support would force businesses to take modest steps toward fulfilling
their environmental responsibilities in foreign nations.
More basic goals can be achieved by requiring that
MOFCOM/DFEC’s initial analysis include a substantial and reliable
environmental impact assessment of every major project. Legal authority
for this requirement arguably exists within the current Measures for
Overseas Investment Management. Article 12 of the Measures requires
that an array of application materials be submitted to MOFCOM for
approval before projects begin,118 but because that Ministry’s primary

115. Id. at 42; OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 89.
116. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 265.
117. Id.
118. Article 12 requires:
An enterprise making any overseas investment prescribed in Article 6 or 7 of these
Measures shall submit the following materials:
1. an application form, which shall mainly cover the name, registered capital,
amount of investment, scope of business and duration of business of the overseas
enterprise, an explanation of sources of investment capital, the specific contents of
the investment, the equity structure, the analysis and assessment of the investment
environment, and a statement of lack of any of the circumstances prescribed in Article 9 of these Measures;
2. a photocopy of the business license of the enterprise;
3. the bylaw of the overseas enterprise and the relevant agreement or contract;
4. the approval or filing document issued by the relevant state department;
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focus is economic, it reviews primarily financial arrangements and
investment conditions. However, the final subsection (Article 12,
Section 6) gives MOFCOM the authority to require “other documents as
specified by the competent department,” which could easily be defined
to include an MEP-approved EIA.119 Ideally, there would be some
mechanism for ensuring that environmental data were subject to
independent verification. Developing a culture of compliance and
increasing the reliability of such assessments would be no simple task,
but any level of increased attention to environmental issues in both the
planning and operational phases will be an improvement.
Additionally, Article 9 of the Measures requires MOFCOM to deny
an application if a proposed project will damage China’s relationship
with the host nation.120 As it becomes clearer that environmental
destruction can damage relationships between China and the host, this
clause should be used to reject projects that pose a serious threat to the
environment, particularly where that threat has health implications for
local residents.121
3. Regulatory Standards
While a general re-structuring of the bureaucratic oversight
mechanisms would permit more centralized review, increased efficiency,
and better decision making,122 improvements are possible within the
5. a Pre-report on Overseas Merger or Acquisition (see Annex 3 for its format) if it
is an overseas investment in the category of merger and acquisition; and
6. other documents as specified by the competent department . . . .
The Measures for Overseas Investment Management, supra note 77.
119. Id.
120. Article 9 provides:
Where the overseas investment of an enterprise falls under any of the following circumstances, the Ministry of Commerce or the provincial commerce department shall disapprove it:
1. endangering the state sovereignty, national security and public interests of China
or violating a law or regulation of China;
2. damaging the relationship between China and a relevant country or region;
3. likely violating any international treaty concluded by China with a foreign party;
or
4. involving any technology or goods prohibited by China from import.
The economic and technical feasibility of an overseas investment shall be the sole responsibility of the enterprise . . . .
Id.
121. See, e.g., Gill & Reilly, supra note 73, at 46 (describing the high profile anti-Chinese
backlash in Zambia following a deadly mine explosion in 2006).
122. This assumes of course that the government’s intense involvement in commercial transactions can deliver these benefits at all. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 89. The OECD recommends
that the government remove its oversight authority and permit firms to make investment decisions
based on their evaluation of the markets.
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current system by the simple application of meaningful standards to the
approval process. For example, there are no firm guidelines governing
environmental impact assessments, nor is there any mechanism to allow
third parties to review them for accuracy and completeness. Without
third party review, there is no mechanism to verify the accuracy of
completed project assessments.
In order to facilitate meaningful oversight of corporate conduct
generally, the government must develop and support a system of
nationally recommended standards that corporations will eventually be
required to meet. Such standards could draw on accepted environmental
norms and specific international standardization schemes, such as the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Companies and ISO systems. Each
of these systems provides specific guidelines for ensuring responsible
conduct, including due diligence and management of suppliers. Some
8,000 companies in China have been certified as meeting ISO 14001
standards,123 and there is increasing evidence of Chinese corporations
referencing or working within OECD guidelines as a result of their
global business contacts.124 This is so because OECD member State
corporations are expected to promote conformity with OECD standards
throughout their supply chains.125 Because China is a link in so many
supply chains leading to Western OECD nations, its major international
corporations have necessarily worked with their Western partners to
raise operating standards within China. The next step is to extend these
practices beyond China’s domestic production facilities to their
suppliers.
While we should not expect China to adopt these international
standards universally, they provide a proper starting point for developing
a system to fit China’s needs. In order to have an effect, any guidelines
China issues will have to be sector-specific and will have to avoid the
kind of vague language that plagues its legal regulations. While this is a
daunting task, China’s domestic textile industry successfully developed
sector-specific national standards in 2006,126 which shows that such
standards can, in fact, be created and implemented. This kind of effort
could be mounted in the mining industry, for example, with the aid of
international organizations like the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative and domestic coalitions like the China International Mining
123. Id. at 186.
124. Id. at 151.
125. Id.; OECD GUIDELINES, ¶ 2, § 1 (Concepts and Principles).
126. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 213–14. China’s National Textile and Apparel Council
piloted a CSR standard among its ten member enterprises. The China Social Compliance standard
(CSC9000T) is one result of an extended E.U.-China Trade Program that has been working to support China’s integration into the world trading system.
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Group.127 Industry trade groups should work with the government to
develop meaningful standards in the sectors that Chinese companies are
most involved in overseas because, as SEPA noted during the course of
one such collaboration, “industrial associations are familiar with their
own industry’s technology and management, so their participation will
make economic policy more pertinent.”128 So long as industry is not
empowered to entirely write its own rules, such collaboration can be
valuable.
Once in place, specific standards can be used to hold companies
accountable for their actions through several mechanisms. If the
standards are legally binding (which is unlikely in the short to medium
term), then companies that fail to achieve them could be punished or
fined. More likely, perhaps, is a less stringent approach that would use
the standards as reference points by which interested parties could
measure a company’s social responsibility. This would help facilitate
meaningful assessment and reporting of corporate conduct abroad and
could have a real impact if government officials considered these reports
when evaluating applications for further investment or expansion abroad.
Even if such evaluations had no legal effect, public pressure would be
more easily harnessed if an interested party could publicize specific
shortcomings in a company’s business practices.
4. Foreign Application of Chinese Laws
Another option is to extend the application of Chinese laws to
foreign operators and subsidiaries so that these entities are subject to the
oversight and legal authority of Chinese officials. The drawbacks and
difficulties of implementing a system of extraterritorial application of
home State laws are discussed in Part II.B.1, but it is nevertheless
possible that the Chinese government will have to extend its reach
further into foreign operations if it truly wants to confront this issue. As
noted earlier, China and several other developing nations appear to
increasingly expect home States to exert some control over the
multinational corporations operating within developing host nations.
Chinese officials should recognize that they must accept that
responsibility if their corporations are to continue spreading across the
globe.
While it will be difficult to implement such a program, many States
have laws that apply to corporate conduct in foreign nations, so there is
127. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 118, 211–12.
128. SEPA Working with Industrial Associations for Environmental Policy, CSR CHINA (Sept.
17, 2007), http://www.chinacsr.com/en/2007/09/17/1689-sepa-working-with-industrial-associationsfor-environmental-policy.
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precedent for such a legal regime.129 But even the United States does not
require its corporations to abide by all American laws in their overseas
operations (minimum wage requirements, for example),130 so it is
difficult to imagine the Chinese government fully applying its domestic
laws to operations in far-off nations such as Zambia and Sudan.
Nevertheless, no corporation can expect its overseas operations to be
entirely beyond the reach of its home State’s legal authority. The
Chinese government can legitimately implement and enforce regulations
abroad if it chooses to do so.
This idea has gained some support in China, and the government
now has certain regulations that extend to corporate operations outside of
its borders.131 The Guide on Sustainable Overseas Silviculture, for
example, applies to “regulating and guiding the whole process of the
overseas activities of Chinese enterprises in silviculture . . . .”132 Most
importantly, these regulations require a thorough environmental
assessment and a sustainability plan for all Chinese logging operations
overseas, even when such a plan is not required by host State law.133 The
Guidelines also urge operators to reach out to local residents by
“establish[ing] a consultative mechanism with the local community.”134
There is, however, no clear enforcement mechanism, nor any avenue for
affected residents to seek enforcement or compensation if they suffer
harm. Furthermore, the guidelines suffer from a lack of specificity, as do
most Chinese laws. Nevertheless, the development and issuance of
guidelines in other major industries would begin the process of extending
extraterritorial jurisdiction to Chinese companies that operate abroad.
Another recent development may indicate that Chinese officials are
moving even further toward directly applying Chinese law abroad. In the
summer of 2009, China Daily reported that MEP and MOFCOM had
completed a draft of mandatory measures that would set forth many of
the legal obligations we have discussed in this article to all Chinese
129. “In the United States, for example, the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) all confer (or have been interpreted to confer) extraterritorial jurisdiction over corporate actors.” Broecker, supra note 54, at 182.
130. Id. at 183–84.
131. Most of the regulations, however, apply to offshore oil activities and protecting the marine environment, both of which are areas in which all home nations are expected to regulate their
corporations. These include, for example, the Marine Environment Protection Law, Regulations
Concerning Environmental Protection in Offshore Oil Exploration and Exploitation, Regulations on
the Prevention of Pollution Damage to the Marine Environment by Land-sourced Pollutants, Regulations on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures of Offshore Oil Exploitation Projects.
132. GUIDE ON SUSTAINABLE OVERSEAS SILVICULTURE (Aug. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.geichina.org/_upload/file/Guide_silviculture_EN.pdf.
133. Id. § 5.2.
134. Id. § 6.4.

2012]

Feeding the Dragon

373

companies involved in overseas projects.135 The regulations would
require all companies to comply with the environmental laws of the host
nation and, in cases where Chinese standards exceed those of the host
nation, to meet Chinese standards.136
MOFCOM and MEP are apparently reviewing these guidelines for
possible promulgation.137 If the guidelines are ultimately issued, they
would be significant for a number of reasons. Companies would be
forced to pay more attention to the legal requirements of the sector in
which they operate or risk violating Chinese law. Companies would
hopefully be more likely to comply because they are more familiar with
the Chinese laws that apply to their particular business and might be
more concerned if penalties were assessed at home rather than in the host
State. The real effect on conduct in host countries may not be as
substantial as one might hope given the low standards of both host and
Chinese laws, but the fact that the government is considering this matter
seriously is important in itself. If these regulations become part of
Chinese corporate law they could have a real effect on the ground.
B. The Role of Financial Institutions
Financial institutions are also well positioned to encourage more
environmentally responsible conduct. Chinese banks appear to have
recognized this in recent years, but they must begin to move beyond
cursory policy statements and implement recognized international
standards to ensure that the projects they fund are not overly
destructive.138
1. Lending Standards that Reference Environmental Issues
International banks and institutions currently use several sets of
lending criteria to evaluate the potential social and environmental
impacts of proposed projects. While traditional banks and lending
institutions typically use the Equator Principles (EP) to evaluate aid
projects, the World Bank’s IFC uses its Performance Criteria.139 Both
systems employ specific standards to evaluate projects with respect to
pollution prevention, greenhouse gas emissions, management of
135. Li Jing, Green Rules Eye Chinese Firms Abroad, CHINA DAILY, May 29, 2009,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-05/29/content_7952605.htm.
136. Id. There are also provisions requiring companies to compensate nations and/or victims
for environmental damage they inflict, but no information on how that might be calculated is yet
available. The draft also includes provisions mandating environmental impact assessments, mitigation strategies, and adherence to all environmental treaties to which China is a party.
137. Jing, supra note 135.
138. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 91.
139. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 169.
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hazardous wastes, and biodiversity protection.140 If a proposal does not
satisfy the criteria, the lending institution is expected to deny funding.141
If a project is approved, frequent consultations between lenders,
corporations, and independent experts help firms respond to
environmental and social concerns early in the planning process when it
is still feasible to adjust the project to avoid the identified problems.142
Such standards are now routine in the international project finance
market.143 However, China’s banks have not embraced the standards as
fully as Western banks.144 Banks in China do not face the degree of
social pressure and criticism that Western banks associated with
environmentally destructive projects tend to receive.145 Publicly-listed
Western institutions are typically subject to various disclosure
requirements that allow shareholders and regulators to monitor CSR
activities. The majority of Chinese lenders (including, most importantly,
Ex-Im Bank) are not subject to rigorous disclosure requirements, so they
feel neither social nor legal pressure to avoid potentially destructive
projects.146
The central government has recently pressured banks to pay more
attention to the environmental effects of the projects they finance in
order to enhance China’s image as a socially responsible business
partner.147 As a result, some positive steps have occurred to improve
consultation at the lending stage. In the domestic arena, beginning in the
mid-1990s, “the People’s Bank of China adopted a policy of refusing to
extend credit to firms that did not correctly dispose of their industrial
waste or that failed to meet State standards for environmental
protection.”148 Moreover, in July 2007, SEPA, the People’s Bank of
China (PBOC), and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
implemented the “green credit policy,” establishing systemic links
between environmental protection agencies and credit administration
institutions.149 The “green credit policy” allows banks “to suspend or
limit loans to enterprises violating environmental laws.”150 The OECD
140. See id. at 150–67 (describing the details of the IFC’s Performance Criteria); see also Haglund, supra note 61, at 565.
141. Haglund, supra note 61, at 565.
142. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 154.
143. In fact, seventy-five percent of global project financing is provided by banks that have
signed onto the EPs. Haglund, supra note 61, at 565.
144. Id. at 565–66.
145. Id. at 566.
146. Id.
147. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 145.
148. ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 116.
149. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 264.
150. Id.
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reported that in the first year of the program’s existence, SEPA
“provided more than 30,000 pieces of information on violation[s] of
environmental laws to the Credit Information System Bureau” so that
commercial banks could implement the policy and begin restricting
funds.151 One year later, SEPA signed an agreement with the IFC to help
introduce the Equator Principles domestically. However the criteria are
not slated to apply to overseas projects, and Ex-Im has not fully adopted
the EPs.152
Currently, the “green credit policy” only applies to firms operating
within China.153 The green credit system should expand to include
foreign operations in at least two ways. First, if a Chinese firm has
previously violated the environmental laws of a host nation, lenders
should refuse to extend credit to that firm and its subsidiaries. Second,
Chinese firms with excessive violations of Chinese law domestically
should not receive financing to establish or invest in foreign operations.
Responsible authorities need to establish a system for disclosing
information on companies who violate laws overseas in order to make
such a system successful. Ex-Im Bank must be covered in order for the
policy to have any meaningful effect.
Among credit exporting banks, both Ex-Im and CDB have
increased the visibility of their CSR initiatives over the last couple of
years. A member of the U.N. Global Compact since 2006, CDB claims it
has made significant improvements in monitoring and reporting the
environmental impacts of the projects that it finances.154 On at least one
occasion, CDP hired Det Norske Veritas, a leading international
classification and compliance organization, to audit its reports and
initiatives.155
Although not a member of the Global Compact, Ex-Im Bank
increasingly publicizes its own efforts to incorporate environmental
standards into its project review process.156 Though many of its policies
arguably lack the necessary detail to guide decision makers in evaluating
proposals, they nevertheless indicate the bank’s willingness to begin
incorporating environmental concerns into its lending process. Ex-Im
151. Id.
152. Haglund, supra note 61, at 565–66.
153. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 264.
154. See, e.g., Press Release, China Development Bank, CDB Releases 2010 Social Responsibility Report (June 24, 2011), available at http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/NewsInfo.as
p?NewsId=3776.
155. China Development Bank Releases Corporate Social Responsibility Report, CHINA CSR
(Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.chinacsr.com/en/2008/10/08/3290-china-development-bank-releasescorporate-social-responsibility-report.
156. See, e.g., OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 190 (citing the environmental policy guidelines
of Ex-Im Bank).
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Bank also retains authority to discontinue funding if negative
environmental impacts occur during the life of a project,157 but it is
doubtful that this extreme remedy has been utilized. Finally, the policy
requires a post-project review to evaluate the accuracy of the EIA and
address outstanding concerns.158
While these policies are laudable (and similar on their face to IFC’s
policies), the amount of damage done by Ex-Im-funded projects suggests
that the policies are not enforced in practice. Because the Ex-Im policies
are strictly internal,159 the bank suffers no real harm if it fails to abide by
them. Equally importantly, there are no assurances regarding the
accuracy of assessments or effectiveness of mitigation measures. Even if
a host nation approves the assessments, the approval may be meaningless
if the investing firm has underestimated or underreported potential
environmental impacts, or if financial pressures compel the host nation
to sign off on destructive projects. The IFC addresses this problem by
providing opportunities for independent experts with no financial stake
in the outcome to analyze projects before funds are disbursed.160 The
Chinese lending process should include a similar review. In order to play
an effective role, lenders must adopt more specific and meaningful
guidelines for environmental review and implement mechanisms to
ensure compliance.
2. Enforcement of Standards Through the Contract
Beyond assessments and simple reporting, financial institutions can
enforce substantive requirements on projects they fund through
contractual stipulations and contingent funding. For example, the IFC
requires projects it funds to establish a reporting process that local
citizens can use to file complaints and an independent oversight office
(the Compliance Adviser/Ombudsmen, or CAO) with authority to
monitor active projects.161 The CAO fields complaints from local
citizens, makes site visits to determine compliance with lending
standards, and exercises authority by limiting or placing conditions on
continued financing.162 If problems develop or complaints are received,
the IFC works with the borrower to implement a timetable for meeting
the expected standards, and the IFC may suspend or even withdraw

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 152, 210.
161. Id. at 217–19.
162. Id.
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funding if the situation warrants it.163 Ex-Im Bank and other Chinese
lending institutions should require similar mechanisms to field
complaints regarding Chinese projects in foreign nations, perhaps in
connection with ECC offices.
A more effective solution would emphasize the inclusion of
stipulated operating standards in the lending contract as a condition of
receiving continued funding for a project. Early in the stages of project
planning, the IFC uses consultations between operators, environmental
experts, and lenders to develop firm agreements on operating standards
for individual projects based on the specifics of each venture and the
local environment.164 Chinese lending institutions should follow this
model as well. As specific plans develop in the lending stages of a
project, the details should be reduced to writing and included in the
lending agreement as definitive operating standards. The operating
standards become an enforceable term of the contract that must be met in
order to continue receiving funding. Incorporating fixed standards for
pollutant levels, for example, would contractually bind the borrower to
stay within the permitted levels.
The loan agreement should also reserve monitoring rights to a third
party, such as a local environmental NGO, to help ensure that the
company abides by the stipulations. This will keep banks out of the
business of monitoring environmental impacts and give that power to a
party whose sole interest is monitoring the environmental impacts with
reference to the contractual standards. Furthermore, the contracts should
include more creative provisions to address other unique problems, such
as granting standing to third parties or jurisdiction to specific tribunals to
enforce the terms of the contract in the event of a breach.
3. Financial Markets and Exchanges
Securities and stock exchanges can also help raise the
environmental standards of companies whose shares and commodities
they manage. There are institutional and practical reasons for this. As a
practical matter, public companies—even those that are held largely
under State control—must maintain at least some level of transparency,
163. See Frequently Asked Questions: Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, THE WORLD BANK
(2007), http://go.worldbank.org/MBUL0L3FO0. This extreme remedy is hardly ever invoked, but it
has been used to suspend financing of the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline because of concerns over
human rights abuses in Darfur. Recently, the IFC expressed its commitment to sustainable investments by suspending all financing of palm oil plantations, which have devastated rainforests around
the world, particularly in Indonesia. Robert B. Zoellick, World Bank's IFC Suspends Lending to
Palm Oil Companies, MONGABAY.COM, Sept. 9, 2009, http://news.mongabay.com/2009/0909palm_oil_ifc.html.
164. MORGERA, supra note 38, at 153–54.
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corporate governance, and social responsibility in order to attract
investors. As noted, investors are increasingly reluctant to associate with
environmentally irresponsible companies.165 Companies who want to
attract wealthy investors, particularly those from Western nations, must
act responsibly. This requires companies not only to institute policies to
prevent environmental harm abroad, but also to foster a culture of
compliance by developing methods to report and publicize CSR efforts.
Several Chinese banks have undertaken such initiatives in connection
with their transformations into joint stock companies and IPO
offerings.166
Chinese market regulators have the power to establish disclosure
and corporate governance requirements and have done so with regard to
accounting procedures, record authentication, and other internal
processes.167 For example, the national Accounting Law now requires
listed companies to comply with the Ministry of Finance’s Accounting
Standards for Business Enterprises, which are largely consistent with the
International Financial Accounting Standards.168 By requiring Chinese
companies to adhere to these internationally-recognized principles, the
government has forced them to raise their standard of corporate
governance and has begun cultivating a fledgling culture of compliance.
A few policies indicate that this mechanism is becoming more
popular domestically. SEPA’s 2008 “green securities policy,” for
example, requires companies in heavily polluting industries to submit to
an environmental audit and disclose environmental information prior to
issuing an IPO or refinancing through a securities market.169 Local
exchanges have issued even more proactive directives designed to
promote responsible corporate conduct. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange,
for example, issued its Social Responsibility Instructions to Listed
Companies in September 2006 and has been helping the 488 companies
listed on its exchange learn how to apply them.170 The guidelines instruct
listed companies to “formulate environmental protection policies” and
devote resources to establishing, implementing, and improving systems
to protect the environment wherever the companies operate.171
165. See, e.g., Buhmann, supra note 96, at 83.
166. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 91–92.
167. Id. at 192.
168. Id. at 193.
169. Id. at 264–65.
170. Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Instructions to Listed Companies, SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH. (Sept. 25, 2006), http://www.szse.cn/main/en/rulseandregulations/sserules/20070
60410636.shtml [hereinafter Shenzhen Instructions]; see also OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 211
(describing implementation since the instructions were issued).
171. Shenzhen Instructions, supra note 170, at Art. 27.
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Companies are supposed to ensure that their environmental protection
procedures facilitate compliance with the relevant laws, reduce resource
consumption and waste, and minimize adverse impacts.172 Significantly,
Article 30 requires companies to report their pollution discharges to the
proper authorities and pay any fines if they violate local laws.173
While the effectiveness of these provisions is open for debate in
light of the significant shortcomings in oversight and regulation of
polluting industries within China, it is noteworthy that individual
exchanges are stepping forward to institute their own requirements for
corporate environmental responsibility. OECD reports that the Shenzhen
guidelines have had at least some impact domestically,174 implying that
the guidelines could be even more useful if foreign conduct is
increasingly considered part of a company’s overall CSR profile. An
enforcement mechanism would be ideal since the effectiveness of the
non-mandatory guidelines is necessarily limited. Companies require
large amounts of capital to conduct operations overseas. Therefore, if
listed companies face the real possibility of sanctions in the form of
limited or suspended trading, owners and investors will have sufficient
incentive to raise their environmental standards in foreign operations.
C. Actions by Third Party Governments
Given the difficult nature of changing the system from within
China, outside pressures may be needed to raise the level of responsible
Chinese corporate conduct. Some nations have attempted to deal with
illegal or destructive resource acquisition by controlling the products that
can be imported into their nations. The European Union has, for
example, implemented laws to address illegally harvested timber.175
While such actions may draw criticism,176 they can have an effect on
behavior by shifting enforcement responsibility from an unwilling host
nation to an interested importing nation.

172. Id. at Art. 28.
173. Id. at Art. 30.
174. OECD REVIEW, supra note 8, at 211.
175. Rhett A. Butler, Illegal Timber Trade to Face Tough Penalties in the E.U.,
MONGABAY.COM, Feb. 18, 2009, http://news.mongabay.com/2009/0218-timber_eu.html.
176. Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, for example,
which was signed by many developing nations, strongly condemns “trade policy measures for environmental purposes” as a means of “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.” United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex 1, Principle 12 (Aug. 12, 1992), excerpted in ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 202.
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1. The Lacey Act
177

The U.S. Lacey Act was initially drafted to prevent trade in
endangered animals but has been expanded to include trade in products
derived from illegally harvested foreign wood.178 Under the Act,
American importers and producers are barred from dealing in any wood
products harvested in violation of the producing nation’s laws.179 The
Act applies regardless of whether the foreign law imposes civil or
criminal penalties, and even if the law itself is not actively enforced in
the producing nation.180 All imported wood products must be labeled
with a description of the scientific name of any wood used in the
product, the value and quantity of each, and the name of the country
from which it was harvested.181
However, this documentation is not sufficient on its own. The
Lacey Act imposes strict liability: importers are strictly liable for
possessing products made from illegally harvested wood,182 though they
may be found less culpable depending on the degree of due diligence.183
The main problem with the system is that host State laws may not be
particularly rigorous. No matter how lax a producing State’s laws may
be, the Lacey Act does not impose liability if producers comply with
those laws.184
Nevertheless, the Lacey Act is a good example of a third-party
government requiring companies to take responsibility for the actions of
their suppliers. More than simply requiring a paper trail, it imposes
investigative responsibilities on anyone wishing to import wood or wood
products into the largest consumer market in the world. This is crucial
because a paper trail is not enough to ensure real compliance with host
laws when forgery is commonplace.185 Rather, importers must
investigate and develop relationships with suppliers that they trust to
comply with local laws.186

177. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (2006).
178. Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 1664, 2052–2056 (2008).
179. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 4(a), 122 Stat.
1664, 2053 (2008).
180. Id.
181. WORLD RES. INST., FACT SHEET: ARE YOU READY FOR THE LACEY ACT? (2009), available at http://www.wri.org/stories/2009/12/fact-sheet-are-you-ready-lacey-act.
182. See, e.g., United States v. Proceeds from Sale of Approximately 15,538 Panulirus Argus
Lobster Tails, 834 F. Supp. 385, 390–91 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 3374(a)(1)).
183. WORLD RES. INST., supra note 181.
184. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 1664, 2053
(2008).
185. WORLD RES. INST., supra note 181.
186. Id.
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2. Supply Chain Tracking for Other Resources
The question is whether the United States (or any other importing
nation) can create a similar system to monitor the metals and minerals
that Chinese corporations are acquiring in Africa. The unreliability and
uncertainty of record keeping within the Chinese supply chains poses an
initial hurdle. Many producers have very little knowledge or interest in
keeping up with the source of their raw materials.187
Moreover, even if supply chain tracking is possible in the wood
industry, a system dealing with metals and minerals would entail
additional practical difficulties. The ability to track shipments to their
source, in particular, would be lost. Whereas a supplier can label a wood
shipment with a scientific name and source location at the time of
harvesting, the same may not be true of metals, which are smelted and
blended together soon after extraction in order to be sent to China for use
as wires or other components in countless factories across the country. It
may be impossible to examine a product or even a shipment of a single
type of ore to verify that it came from a particular source and was
extracted legally, much less sustainably.
Despite these inherent difficulties, supply chain tracking and due
diligence requirements may still prove useful. Supply chain tracking
would force companies to keep records and pay some level of attention
to the source of their raw materials. Such a system could be implemented
piecemeal and build upon the kinds of reporting procedures that are
already in place for wood products and human rights issues.
Furthermore, supply chain tracking could occur without requiring much,
if any, Chinese government involvement, as Western MNCs would be
urged or required to participate by the governments and organizations of
their home countries. As records are kept more universally, MNCs and
international NGOs should be better able to monitor source conditions
and publicize shortcomings. Whether or not there are legal repercussions
for failing to report, increased attention and negative publicity could be
very effective tools for pressuring Western businesses to use suppliers
with higher standards. This system could eventually evolve into a more
complete legal regime to foster due diligence regarding supply chains
that include metals or minerals imported from China and elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between African nations and China has the
potential to benefit both parties greatly. But the projects that have the
potential both to help lift African nations out of poverty and to fuel the
187. Buhmann, supra note 96, at 77.
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Chinese business machine must involve some level of environmental
awareness and responsibility. This article has discussed the shortcomings
and opportunities that exist in the Chinese-African OFDI process and
how the process could be changed to further incorporate environmental
considerations. Most importantly, this article has suggested some ways
to improve the process without adversely affecting the parties’ goals.
None of the suggestions we make would significantly curb trade or
impose undue hardship on businesses. We hope that by fostering a
system that protects long-term interests while facilitating short-term
acquisitions, the Chinese-African relationship can contribute to the
development of these two vital regions in a way that is mutually
beneficial and environmentally and economically sustainable.

